Fragile peace in Tripoli: Can Libya’s militias be disarmed without renewed conflict?
Tripoli has been a tense area since May 2025, when the Government of National Unity (GNU) started a set of operations in order to destroy the strong militias rooted in the capital. Dissolution of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), which was a security outfit of immense territorial and institutional presence, was the most controversial step. Its dismantling set out fiery exchanges between it and the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) and allied militias at a standstill in transit in major areas and has elicited a crisis UN mandate.
The standoff persists despite the fact that fighting had reduced considerably. In some areas armed convoys are still patrolling and civilians report occasional gun shooting and blocked roads. As noted by both the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as well as the Humanitarian Advisory Group, amassing of arms in the capital may lead to a violation of the ongoing ceasefire, especially those initiated by the Joint Military Commission and the Truce and Security Committees.
From revolution to institutionalized militias
The embedded nature of armed groups
Militias are very rooted in the post-Gaddafi state apparatus in Libya. Without a national army, they took up security duties in most cities including Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. Gradually, these groups managed to get political power and official legitimacy and most of the captains were promoted to the official positions in the state.
Such institutionalization has rendered disarmament processes politically contentious and functional challenging. These armed groups offer employment opportunities, territorial domination and a local system of justice. Their elimination or reorganization can easily translate into dislodging power centers, which have become virtually impunity driven, over a decade.
Competing loyalties and tribal affiliations
Although some militias profess their loyalty to the central government, a large percentage of them are loyal to regional, tribal or religious interests. Transactional alliances have been long needed in Tripoli to determine the balance of power. A separate system resulted in formal and informal power being undistinguished because groups such as Rada and the defunct SSA operated relatively independently with state support.
The government’s move to dissolve the SSA disrupted this balance, especially as no credible integration plan was proposed. That failure has led to fears that other groups may resist future disarmament attempts unless accompanied by clear political guarantees.
The security sector’s fragmentation
The limits of state control
The administration led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh has always expressed a desire to reclaim the state power over all armed parties. Yet the inability of the government to implement this aim appears as one of the main issues. Official security agencies are not well coordinated and equipped with guns that would confront militias without exposing the country to bloodshed.
With the vacuum of security, there have emerged the checkpoints, the informal prisons, and the extortion networks. A human rights adviser in Tripoli said,
“many residents don’t know whether the man at the checkpoint is a policeman, a militiaman, or both.”
Challenges to security reform
It has been difficult to integrate armed groups into a centralized and common command structure. Earlier proposed reforms in the previous years since 2016 have failed to progress or even failed because of political wrangling and failure to get a touch of international cooperation. The latest effort to create National Security Integration Initiatives in 2023 supported by the UN has not achieved a functional database of militia participating nor common training standards.
Many militias see integration as a pathway to losing autonomy. Leaders are not willing to play ball unless there are promises of pay, position maintenance, or some legal protection. Because of this, the GNU is in a dilemma, either to move ahead and risk a confrontation or keep things at status quo by stakeholding.
The political divide fueling instability
Rival authorities and contested legitimacy
Libya’s political fragmentation compounds the security challenge. The GNU, which is stationed in Tripoli, remains unaccepted by the House of Representatives in the east and its affiliated Libyan National Army (GoL) controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. These competing bodies point accusations of corruption and illegitimacy by the other, along with foreign pledges.
Each faction supports aligned militias. This dual structure undermines the credibility of disarmament efforts, as armed groups often hedge their loyalty in anticipation of political shifts. Rada, for instance, has long been suspected of receiving tacit support from Haftar-aligned networks despite operating in Tripoli.
Foreign actors and their military proxies
Foreign interference exacerbates Libya’s militia problem. This binomial organization one can easily discredit the attempts to demilitarize because the armed organizations tend to reserve their allegiances after political realignments. An example is Rada that has always been suspected of being given tacit support by Haftar-allied networks despite running in Tripoli.
These foreign powers often prioritize strategic interests over Libyan unity. Their backing makes local militias more resilient and less inclined to heed central government orders, especially when those orders threaten their survival.
Civilian cost and humanitarian concerns
Displacement and infrastructure damage
Even short-term militia clashes have dire consequences for civilians. The May 2025 fighting displaced over 2,000 residents in Tripoli’s Abu Salim and Ain Zara districts. Water and electricity outages were reported for several days, while hospitals struggled to function amid road blockages and supply shortages.
According to the Tripoli Medical Committee, three civilians died due to delayed access to emergency care during the fighting. Human rights monitors warn that renewed violence could disrupt education, healthcare, and food access in a city already scarred by years of unrest.
International law and civilian protection
UNSMIL has reminded all parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law. A spokesperson noted that
“attacks on civilian infrastructure, arbitrary detention, and denial of humanitarian access constitute serious violations.”
The mission has urged the government to conduct independent investigations into alleged abuses and ensure that displaced families receive assistance.
Civil society groups inside Tripoli have called for an oversight mechanism to monitor militia compliance with disarmament agreements, arguing that transparency is key to regaining public trust.
Dialogue and disarmament pathways
Security frameworks and coordination
UNSMIL continues to support the Joint Military Commission and Truce Committee efforts to coordinate militia withdrawals and prevent further confrontations. The proposed roadmap includes phased disarmament, supervised demobilization, and integration of vetted personnel into a restructured national security force.
The roadmap also calls for cantonment sites where weapons would be collected and stored under international supervision. This plan, however, remains largely aspirational due to weak enforcement capabilities and lack of agreement on command structures.
Economic reintegration and political guarantees
To succeed, any disarmament initiative must offer viable alternatives to fighters. The Libyan Economic Stabilization Fund, backed by EU and African Union partners, has proposed a skills retraining program for former militia members, focusing on infrastructure repair, logistics, and local administration.
Militia leaders have also demanded legal guarantees against future prosecution and political exclusion. The GNU has offered limited amnesty provisions, but no formal framework has been ratified by Parliament. Without such assurances, many armed actors remain unwilling to fully disengage.
Insights from analysts and observers
Mario Nawfal, a political analyst and someone with strong links to the Libyan civil society, wrote in an interview to Al Jazeera on the issue of disarming militia groups. He also emphasized the doctrine of inclusion instead of confrontation, indicating that the government should involve militias as partners in security reform and not as an enemy to be defeated. Nawfal said that without an honorable departure of the armed actors, an eruption of wider fighting was a possibility.
🇱🇾 UN TO LIBYA: EVERYBODY CHILL BEFORE THIS BLOWS UP AGAIN
— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) July 9, 2025
The UN is begging all sides in Tripoli to stop flexing and maybe not start another war.
Armed groups are piling into the capital, and things have already exploded once; 8 civilians died after PM Dbeibah tried shutting… pic.twitter.com/YG7s2w6fae
What lies ahead for Tripoli?
The arms problem in Libya does not concern the weapons only; it involves the legitimacy, economic access, and the power of authority in a small society. The possibility of answering these questions without driving any of these groups into the new violence is what keeps the fragile peace at the borders of Tripoli.
The GNU’s push to dismantle powerful militias signals a necessary shift toward rebuilding state authority, but its implementation must be careful and inclusive.The next months will decide how Tripoli will lead to a new model of peaceful reintegration-or will become a warning of premature state action.
That solution might be in the hands of the streets of Tripoli but it may as well be in what occurs in Geneva, Cairo, and Ankara where deals are placed and proxy agendas formed. Is Libya now going to embark on a united path to security and sovereignty or will once more the confrontation cycles of mistrust and exclusion blight their steps? The equilibrium, at this, is really precarious.
